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Abstract 
We propose a new approach to the use of circumscription for representing knowledge. Nested 
abnormality theories are similar to simple abnormality theories introduced by McCarthy, except 
that their axioms may have a nested structure, with each level corresponding to another applica- 
tion of the circumscription operator. The new style of applying circumscription sometimes leads 
to more economical and elegant formalizations. Mathematical properties of nested abnormality 
theories may be easier to investigate. These advantages are demonstrated by recasting several fa- 
miliar applications of circumscription in the new format, including some examples of inheritance 
hierarchies, the domain closure assumption and causal minimization. Nested abnormality theories 
provide also a convenient representation for the explanation closure approach to the frame problem 
developed by Schubert. 
1. Introduction 
The methodology for representing defaults developed by McCarthy [ 151 involves the 
use of an “abnormality predicate” and the application of circumscription to minimize its 
extent. Since circumscribing abnormality can be performed in many different ways, one 
needs to decide which strategy to follow. McCarthy explored several possibilities, and 
none of them turned out to be completely satisfactory. 
One of his proposals is to use simple abnormality theories, in which the circum- 
scription of abnormality is done with all predicates varied. Because simple abnormality 
theories employ a standard circumscription policy, such a theory is completely character- 
ized by the list of its axioms Al, . . . , A,,, just like an axiomatic theory in classical logic. 
McCarthy notes, however, that this strategy is much too specialized. It is sometimes 
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important that only a part of the predicates available in the language be allowed to vary, 
the others being fixed; otherwise, circumscription may lead to unintuitive consequences. 
The general principle seems to be that a predicate should be varied if the purpose of 
the application of circumscription is to describe the extent of that predicate. McCarthy 
motivates his decision to vary the predicate flies in one of the examples by saying that 
“the purpose of the axiom set is to describe what flies”. Then he writes: “Suppose 
that we contemplate taking bird as variable also. In the first place, this violates the 
intuition that deciding what flies follows deciding what is a bird in the common-sense 
situations we want to cover. Secondly, if we use exactly the above axioms and admit 
bird as variable, we will further conclude that the only birds are penguins, canaries and 
ostriches.” [ 15, Section 51. 
On the other hand, sometimes one needs to vary a function, rather than a predicate. 
For instance, the situation calculus function Result is varied in the solution to the frame 
problem proposed by Baker [ 1 I. 
These observations suggest the generalization of simple abnormality theories in which 
one is allowed to specify, in addition to an axiom set, the predicate and/or function 
constants Ct , . . . , C,,, that are “described” by the axioms. A possible syntax for such 
theories is 
CI, . . . . C,, : A1 ,..., A,,. (1) 
The circumscription operator allows us to translate (1) into the language of classical 
second-order logic by forming the circumscription of the abnormality predicate Ab 
relative to the conjunction of the axioms A I A . . A A, with Ct , . . . , C, allowed to vary; 
symbolically, 
CIRC[A, r\...r\A,;Ab;C ,,..., C,,,]. 
(See [ 121 for the definition of the circumscription operator and related notation.) 
Unfortunately, even this is not general enough. McCarthy describes how to establish 
priorities among the “aspects” to which the abnormality predicate is applied, and ex- 
presses the view “that prioritized circumscription will turn out to be the most natural 
and powerful variant” [ 15, Section 121. However, the applications of circumscription 
to the frame problem in [ 11 and [ 111 required yet another generalization-forming 
a conjunction of several circumscriptions, applied to the same axiom set but having 
different lists of varied predicates and functions. This was codified in the definition of 
“circumscriptive theories” proposed in [ 12, Section 2.61. 
The additional flexibility given by these extensions is a mixed blessing. Even after 
deciding what the axioms will look like, the representer of knowledge still has many 
choices that may allow him to adjust the circumscription so that its effect will be just 
right-not too weak and not too strong. The choices are sometimes motivated by a 
relatively clear principle, such as specificity, but often they have to be made by trial and 
error. It seems that the difficulty of this process is the main reason why circumscription 
is not applied today in knowledge representation as widely as could be expected. 
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to the use of circumscription for 
representing knowledge. Its main idea is to make abnormality theories “nested’‘-to 
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allow each Ai in ( 1) to be a “block” of form ( 1) . Intuitively, each block can be viewed 
as a group of axioms that describes a certain collection of predicates and functions, and 
the embedding of blocks reflects the dependence of these descriptions on each other. 
This format allows us to apply the circumscription operator to a subset of the axioms, 
and not to the whole axiom set, as in [ 151. We will see that nested circumscriptions 
can produce the same results as prioritizations, and often in a more natural way. 
The results of “structuring” a knowledge base have been earlier investigated in the 
context of other nonmonotonic formalisms, including autoepistemic logic [ 81 and logic 
programming [91, Axioms removed from the range of a nonmonotonic interpretation 
are called “constraints” in [ 181 and [ 31, and “observations” in [22]. 
Another innovation proposed here is the replacement of the predicate constant Ab 
in (2) by an existentially quantified predicate variable. In formalizations based on 
circumscription, the abnormality predicate plays an auxiliary role; what we are actually 
interested in are the logical consequences of (2) that do not include Ab. To put it 
differently, if (2) is denoted by F(Ab), and ab is a predicate variable of the same arity 
as Ab, then what we are interested in are the consequences of the sentence 3abF(ab). 
This is a formula not containing Ab, for which (2) is a conservative xtension. 
For example, the default “Normally P(x)” can be expressed by the circumscription 
CIRC[Vx(TAb(x) > P(x));Ab; P], 
which is equivalent to 
‘v’x-Ah(x) AVxP(x). 
We feel that, in this conjunction, the first term is irrelevant, and we would like to 
“forget” it. Technically, this is achieved by using an existentially quantified predicate 
variable in place of the predicate constant Ab: 
3ab(Vxxb(x) /\VxP(x)). 
This formula is equivalent to VxP (x) . 
In the context of nested abnormality theories, one effect of this modification is that 
the abnormality predicate becomes local to the block in which it is used. This is often 
convenient, and, in many cases, allows us to dispense with “aspects”. 
2. Blocks and theories 
Consider a second-order language L that does not include Ab among its symbols. For 
every natural number k, by Lk we denote the language obtained from L by adding Ab 
as a k-ary predicate constant. Blocks are defined recursively as follows: For any k and 
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any list of function and/or predicate constants ’ Ct , . . , C,,, (rn 2 0) of L, if each of 
Al ,..., A, (n>O) isaformulaofLkorablock,then{Ct ,..., C, : Al ,..., A,}isa 
block. The last expression reads: Cl,. . , C,, are such that Al,. . . , A,,. About Ct , . . . , C,,, 
we say that they are described by this block. 
Note that, according to this definition, if Ai and A, are formulas, and Ab occurs in 
both, then it is used in both with the same number of arguments; if, however, Ai or Aj 
is itself a block, then this is not guaranteed. 
A nested abnormality theory (NAT) is a set of blocks, called its axioms. Note that 
each axiom is a finite string of symbols, but there may be infinitely many axioms in a 
NAT. 
The semantics of NATs is characterized by a map p that translates blocks into 
sentences of L. It is convenient to make p defined also on formulas of the languages 
Lk. If A is such a formula, then pA stands for the universal closure of A. For blocks 
we define, recursively: 
rp{Cl>. . .1 cm : A1,...,A,}=3abF(ab), 
where 
F(Ab) =CIRC[pAI r\...r\cpA,;Ab;C,,...,C,,]. 
A sentence A of L will be identified with the block {: A}. It is easy to see that 
cp{: A} is equivalent to A. 
For any NAT T, VT stands for {pA / A t T}. Thus pT is a second-order theory in 
the language L. A model of T is a model of pT in the sense of classical logic. A 
consequence of T is a sentence of L that is true in all models of T. 
If a block A is an axiom of T, then inserting an additional formula in A may result 
in losing some of the consequences of T. In this sense, the formalism defined here 
is nonmonotonic. But adding more axioms to a NAT can only make the set of its 
consequences larger. 
To show how NATs can be used for representing defaults, we will recast several 
familiar applications of circumscription in the new format. 
3. Examples 
3. I. Whether birds can jly 
As the first illustration, take a standard example: objects normally don’t fly; birds 
normally do; canaries are birds; Tweety is a canary. These assertions can be formalized 
as the NAT whose only axiom is 
’ This includes function constants of arity 0 (object constants) and predicate constants of arity 0 (proposi- 
tional constants). 
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{Flies : 
Flies(x) > Ah(x), 
(Flies : 
3.55 
Bird(x) A -Ah(x) > Flies(x), 
Cunary( X) > Bird(x) , 
Cunary( Tweety) 
(3) 
The outer block describes the ability of objects to fly; the inner block gives more 
specific information about the ability of birds to fly. This representation f specificity by 
nesting is different from both methods proposed for this purpose in [ 151 -cancellation 
of inheritance axioms and prioritization. Each of these two methods would require the 
use of aspects (or several abnormality predicates). In a NAT, aspects are only needed 
when it is important rapt o establish priorities between interacting defaults, because then 
the defaults have to be placed in the same block. The “Nixon diamond” [ 211 is an 
example. 
In order to apply 4p to (3), we first have to apply SD to the inner block. It is easy 
to check, using the methods of [ 12, Section 31, that the result is equivalent o the 
conjunction of (the universal closures of) the formulas 
Bird(x) > Flies(x), (4) 
Cunury( x) > Binf( x) (5) 
and 
Cunury( Tweety) . (6) 
Using this technique again, we conclude that sp applied to (3) is equivalent o the 
conjunction of (5), (6) and 
Biml( x) s FZie.s( x) . 
3.2. Whether canaries are birds 
Consider the enhancement of the previous example in which the assertion that all 
canaries are birds is turned into a default.2 Now circumscription is to be used for 
characterizing the extent of the predicate Bird, and that calls for introducing one more 
block. Since “deciding what flies follows deciding what is a bird”, the new block will 
be made innermost: 
‘An inmate who squealed on fellow prisoners would be an exception (John McCarthy, personal 
conversation). 
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{Flies : 
Flies(x) > Ah(x), 
{Flies : 
Bird(x) A -Ab( x) > Flies(x), 
{Bird : 
Cunaq( X) A -Ab( X) > Bird(x) , 
Canary( Tweety) 
In [ 15, Section 111, this example is proposed as motivation for introducing priorities. 
But it is not clear how priorities would help here. The problem is that, in order for the 
new default to work, one would have to vary Bird; that would lead to the undesirable 
result that there are no birds other than canaries. 
3.3. Domain closure assumption 
The domain closure assumption [ 191 is the assumption that every object in the 
universe of discourse is representable by a ground term. The related notion of “domain 
circumscription” is defined in [ 131 and reduced to the (now standard) “predicate” 
circumscription in [ 141. 
The idea of this reduction is to introduce a new kind of atomic formulas, GT (x), 
expressing that x is representable by a ground term, s and postulate 
V’xGT(x). (7) 
The meaning of GT can be expressed by the axioms 
GT(xl) A... r\GT(xk) 3 GT(f(x~,...,xk)) (8) 
for each function constant f available in the language, with circumscription used to 
minimize the extent of CT. (In the special case when f is an object constant, (8) turns 
into GT (f) .) 
It is essential here that (7) is added after the application of the circumscription 
operator. Thus circumscription has to be applied to a proper subset of the axioms. This 
differs from the approach of [ IS]. 4 
It is easy to implement this idea in the framework of NATs. Denote the universal 
closure of (8) by GTf, and assume that the language under consideration has finitely 
many function symbols fi , . . . , f,,, The domain closure assumption can be expressed by 
the axioms 
’ McCarthy’s notation is all(x). 
4 The fact that, in the early work on circumscription, McCarthy sometimes applied the circumscription 
operator to a subset of the theory was noted in [ 41. Theorem 5.3 in that paper shows that this is, apparently, 
unavoidable, if the domain closure assumption is to be reduced to circumscription. 
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VxGT(x), 
{GT : 
GT(x) > Ah(x), 
GTf, 9 
. ..) 
GTs>t 
l. 
(9) 
Let H be the axiom set obtained from (9) by adding the usual unique names axioms 
(expressing that fi , . . . , fn are I- 1 and that their ranges are disjoint). These axioms 
express that the universe of discourse is isomorphic to the Herbrand universe of the 
language-to the set of its ground terms. For any NAT T, the models of T U H are the 
“Herbrand models” of T. 
4. Two special cases 
4.1. Minimizing a predicate 
We will abbreviate blocks of the form 
{P : P(x) 3 Ab(x),Al,. . . ,A,}, 
where P is a predicate constant and x a tuple of distinct variables, as 
{minP : Al,...,A,}. 
For instance, the second axiom in (9) can be written as 
{minGT : 
GTf, 1 
iii;,! 
). 
More generally, we will write 
{Cl,... ,C,,,,P : P(x) >Ab(x),Al,..., A,,} 
as 
{Cl,..., C,,minP : Al ,..., A,}. (10) 
If A,,. . . , A, are sentences (rather than blocks), and Ab does not occur in any of 
them, then ( 10) has the same meaning as the circumscription of P: 
Proposition 1. If Al, . . . , A,, are sentences that do not contain Ab, then 
(P{CI,...* C,,,minP : Al,...,A,} (11) 
358 
is equivalent to 
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CIRC[Ai r\.,,r\A,;P;C ,,..., C,]. (12) 
Proof. Denote the conjunction Al A . . A A, by A( P, C), where C stands for the list 
Ci , , C,,. Then ( 11) can be written as 
Elab[P <abAA(P,C) AGlab’pc(ab’<abAp <ab’AA(p,c))]. (13) 
The third conjunctive term in the brackets can be simplified as follows: 
-3ab’pc(ab’< abAp <ab’AA(p,c)) 
E Tgpc( 3ab’( p < ab’ A ab’ < ab) A A (p, c) ) 
s ~3pc(p < abA A(p,c)). 
This formula implies 
l(P<abAA(P,C)). 
In combination with the first two conjunctive terms in ( 13), the last formula implies 
P = ab. Consequently, ( 13) is equivalent to 
3ab[P=abAA(P,C)AGlpc(p<abAA(p,c))]. 
This can be further rewritten as 
A(P,C) A +~c(p < PA A(p,c)), 
which is identical to (12). q 
4.2. Maximizing a predicate 
It is convenient to write a block of the form 
{C,,. . ,C,,, P : TAb(x) > P(x),Al,. .,A,} 
as 
{Ci ,..., C,,,,maxP : A1 ,..., A,}. 
Maximizing a predicate is equivalent to minimizing its negation: 
Proposition 2. Let Al (P) , . . , A,,(P) be formulas, and let p be a predicate constant 
that does not occur in any of them. If F(P) is the sentence 
p{C,, . . . ,Cm,maxP : AI(P),...,&(P)} 
and C(p) is the sentence 
P{CI 7. . . ,C,,minP : A~(Axl~(x)),...,A,(AxlP(x))}, 
then F(P) is equivalent to G( Ax-P( x)). 
V Lifkhitz/Artijkial Intelligence 74 (1995) 351-365 359 
Pnswf. Denote the conjunction of the universal closures of A1 (P), . . . , A’,(P) by 
A(Ab, C, P), where C stands for the list Cl,. . . , C,,,. Then F(P) is 
3ab[Ax~P(x) < abAA(ab,P,C) 
A +Iab’pc(ab’ < ab A Ax~p( x) < ab’ A A (ab’, p. c) ) 1, 
which is equivalent o 
3ab[ AxTP(x) < ab A A(ab, P, C) 
A Glab’c(ab’<abA3p(Ax~p(x) <ab’AA(ab’,p,c)))]. 
Furthermore, G(F) is 
(14) 
3ab[~<abAA(ab,Ax~~(x),C) 
A Glab’jk(ab’ < ab A p < ab’ A A(ab’, AxljF(x) , c) ) I, 
so that G( Ax+ (x) ) is equivalent to 
3ab[AxlP(x) < abAA(ab,P,C) 
A Glab’jTc( ab’ < ab A p < ab’ A A (ab’, Ax~p( x) , c) ) 1. 
This formula can be further rewritten as 
!lab[AxlP(x) < abAA(ab,P,C) 
A +lab’c(ab’ < abA$(jF < ab’ A A(ab’,Ax--jF(x),c)))]. 
In order to show that it is equivalent to ( 14), it suffices to notice that 
3p(JT 6 ab’AA(ab’,Ax~p(x),c)) 
is equivalent o 
3p(Axlp(x) < ab’ A A(ab’,p,c)). 0 
5. More examples: the frame problem 
5. I. Causal minimization 
Consider now the formalization of the Yale Shooting example that uses the “causal 
minimization” method [ lo]. It involves variables for actions (a), for situations (s), and 
for truth-valued fluents (f). The object constants are: actions Loud, Wait and Shoot; 
situation SO; fluents Loaded and Alive. The binary situation-valued function Result has 
an action term and a situation term as arguments. There are four predicate constants: 
Holds( f, s) expresses that f is true in situation s; Precondition( f, a) expresses that f 
is a precondition for the execution of a; Causes+(a, f) expresses that a causes f to 
become true; Causes- (a, f) expresses that a causes f to become false. ’ Abbreviations: 
Succeeds( a, s) stands for 
Vf( Precondition( f, a) > HoZds( f, s) ); 
5 In [ lo], a ternary predicate Causes is used in place of two binary predicates Causes+, Causes-. 
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Affects( a, f, s) stands for 
Succeeffs( a, s) A ( Causes+ (a, f) V Causes- (a, f) ) . 
One group of axioms characterizes the predicates Precondition, Causes’ and Causes- : 
Precondition (Loaded, Shoot) , 
Cuuses+ (Loud, Loaded), 
Causes- (Shoot, Loaded), 
(15) 
Causes- (Shoot, Alive). 
The main idea of [ 101 is to use circumscription to guarantee that these predicates are 
true only when this is required by axioms (15)-to force these predicates to satisfy 
the “closed world assumption” relative to these axioms. The closed world assumption 
for Precondition implies that actions have no unintended preconditions. This solves the 
qualification problem. The closed world assumption for Causes+ and Causes- implies 
that no unintended changes take place in the world when an action is performed. This 
solves the frame problem. 
It is not easy, however, to implement this plan. Merely circumscribing the three 
predicates would not enforce the closed world assumption relative to axioms (15), 
because the predicates occur in other axioms also (by virtue of being used in the 
abbreviations Succeeds and Affects). A part of the solution is to carefully select the 
circumscription policy, and to allow Holds to vary when Precondition, Causes+ and 
Cuuses- are circumscribed. This achieves the goal at least if we restrict attention to 
“term models” of the circumscription [ 10, Section 31. This restriction can be discarded at 
the price of making the language and the axioms more complicated [ 10, Proposition 21. 
These difficulties would not arise in the framework of NATs. In order to express that 
a subset of axioms is a complete definition of some predicate, we simply turn this subset 
into a block. 
Before presenting the causal minimization method in terms of NATs, we need to 
extend the syntax and semantics of NATs to the case when the underlying language 
L is many-sorted. The only place in Section 2 above that needs to be modified is the 
definition of Lk. In a many-sorted language, a predicate symbol is characterized not 
only by its arity, but also by the sort (~1 of its first argument, the sort (~2 of its second 
argument, etc. Accordingly, instead of understanding k as a natural number, we should 
allow k to be a finite string urcr2 . . . in the alphabet whose characters correspond to the 
sorts of L. 
Now we are ready to describe the causal minimization treatment of Yale Shooting as 
a NAT. 
( 1) Unique names axioms: 
Loud # Wait, 
Loud f Shoot, 
Wait f Shoot, 
Loaded f Alive. 
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(2) Initial conditions: 
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Holds(Alive, SO), 
lHolds( Loaded, SO). 
(3) Definition of Precondition: 
{min Precondition : 
Precondition (Loaded, Shoot) 
1. 
(4) Dejnitions of Causes+ and Causes-: 
{min Causes+ : 
Causes+ (Load, Loaded) 
17 
{min Causes- : 
Causes- (Shoot, Loaded), 
Causes- (Shoot, Alive) 
(5) General laws of motion: 
Succeeds(a, s) A Causes+(a, f) > Holds( f, Result(a, s)), 
Succeeds(a, s) A Causes-(a, f) 3 lHolds( f, ResuZt(a, s) ), 
TAfSects(a, f,s) > (Holds( f, Result(a,s)) = HoZds(f,s)). 
Using Proposition 1 and the methods of [ 12, Section 31, we can rewrite the axioms 
of Groups 3 and 4 as explicit definitions of Precondition, Causes+ and Causes- in 
the sense of first-order logic. Then we can easily verify, using the axioms of Group 1, 
that all ground instances of Causes+(a, f ), Causes-(a, f) and Precondition( f, a) are 
decidable, and that the universal quantifier in the definition of Succeeds can be replaced 
by a finite conjunction. It follows by induction that all ground instances of Holds( f, s) 
are decidable also. In [lo], the corresponding completeness result was rather difficult; 
in the new framework, it becomes quite transparent. 
5.2. Baker’s method 
The circumscriptive solution to the frame problem that uses the existence of situation 
axioms [ 1 ] is reformulated as a NAT in [ 71. Here again, the formulation is simpler in 
the new framework, and the effect of circumscription is easier to investigate. Moreover, 
the formulation in terms of NATs is applicable to nondeterministic actions. Kartha [6] 
showed that this is not the case for Baker’s original solution. 
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5.3. Explanation closure 
Another approach to the frame problem, developed by Haas [ 51, Schubert [23,24] 
and Reiter [ 201, is based on the idea of “explanation closure”. The process of generating 
explanation closure axioms can be conveniently described in terms of NATs. We will 
illustrate this fact with an example borrowed from [ 201. 
The language has variables for robots (r), for the objects that they handle (b, x), 
for actions (a) and for situations (s). The explanation closure method will be used to 
describe how the property of being broken-symbolically, Broken(x, s)-is affected by 
actions of three types: by dropping x on the floor, by exploding a bomb near X, and by 
repairing x. To this end, two auxiliary predicates are introduced, Broken+ and Broken-. 
The formula Broken+(x, s,a) expresses that a changes the value of Broken(x, s) to 
true. Similarly, Broken-(x, s, a) says that a changes the value of Broken(x, s) to false. 
The possibility of doing a in situation s is expressed by Poss( a, s) . 
( 1) Unique names axioms: 
Drop(rl,xl) =Drop(r2,x2) >(rl =r2Ax1 =x2), 
Repair(rl,xl) =Repair(r2,x2) 3 (rl =r2Ax1 =x2), 
Explode( bl ) = Explode( b2) I 6, = b2, 
Drop(rl,xl) + Repair(r2.x2), 
Drop(r, x) Z Explode(b), 
Repair( r, x) # Explode(b). 
(2) Definition of Pass: 
{max Poss : 
Poss(Drop( r, x), s) > HoZding( r, x, s), 
Poss( Repair( r, x) , s) > HasGlue( r, s) , 
Poss(Repair(r,x),s) > Broken(x,s), 
Poss(Explode( 6) , s) > Bomb(b) 
(3) DeBnitions of Broken’ and Broken-: 
{min Broken+ : 
Fragile(x) > Broken+(x,s,Drop(r,x)), 
NextTo( b, x, s) > Broken+( x, s, Explode( b) ) 
13 
{min Broken- : 
Broken-(x,s,Repair(r,n)) 
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(4) Eflect axioms: 
Poss(a, s) A Broken+(x, s,a) > Broken(x,Result(a, s)), 
Poss(a, s) A Broken-(x, s, a) > lBroken(x, Result(a, s)). 
(5) Explanation closure axioms: 
Poss(a, s) A lBroken(x, s) A Broken(x,Result(a,s)) > Broken+(x, ~,a), 
Poss(a,s) ABroken(x,s) A TBroken(x,Result(a,s)) > Broken-(x,s,a). 
Using Propositions 1 and 2 and the methods of [ 12, Section 31, we can rewrite the 
axioms of Groups 2 and 3 as explicit definitions of Pass, Broken+ and Broken- in the 
sense of first-order logic. Having replaced Broken+ and Broken- by their definitions in 
the axioms of Groups 4 and 5, we will arrive at the formulation of effect axioms and 
explanation closure axioms identical to the one given in [ 20, Section 3.11. 
There is a striking similarity between the two solutions to the frame problem- 
causal minimization and explanation closure-when each is presented as a NAT. The 
main difference is that the latter does not use fluent variables. This simplicity comes at a 
price, however: without fluent variables, explanation closure axioms for different fluents 
cannot be combined into a small number of general axioms, such as the “general laws 
of motion” in the causal minimization method. 
Schubert [ 241, whose description of the explanation closure method does not appeal 
to circumscription, argues that the success of the method calls for “a reassessment 
of the proper roles” of monotonic and nonmonotonic approaches to reasoning about 
action. From our perspective, stressing the difference between the explanation closure 
approach as “monotonic” and the others as “nonmonotonic” is not fully justified. Since 
circumscription is merely a syntactic transformation of formulas, any circumscriptive 
representation of a body of knowledge can be viewed as an abbreviated form of a 
representation i  classical logic. Circumscriptive representations are attractive when 
they are more compact and manageable than the formalizations that use classical ogic 
directly. The example above suggests that the explanation closure method may be in this 
category. 
Reiter [ 201 generates first-order explanation closure axioms from effect axioms using 
a process similar to Clark’s completion [21. The circumscriptive presentation of expla- 
nation closure may lead to a generalization of this method that will be applicable to 
nondeterministic actions. 6 
6. Conclusion 
The concept of a nested abnormality theory serves as a basis for a new style of apply- 
ing circumscription to representing defaults. Sometimes it permits more economical and 
elegant formulations than the traditional ones, based on simple or prioritized circum- 
scription. Sometimes it leads to satisfactory solutions where prioritized circumscription 
6 This suggestion was made by Raymond Reiter when this work was presented at the 1994 Festival of Action 
Formalisms at the University of Toronto. 
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seems to fail. The effect of circumscription in a nested abnormality theory is often easier 
to compute. These advantages are due to the fact that, in a nested abnormality theory, 
the circumscription operator can be applied to a small subset of axioms. 
One attractive feature of nonmonotonic formalizations of knowledge is that they 
are often “elaboration tolerant” [ 161 to a larger degree than formalizations based on 
classical logic. It is often possible to enhance a nonmonotonic theory by simply adding 
new formulas to the axiom set, whereas the corresponding enhancement of a classical 
axiomatization would require changing the existing axioms. This happens, for instance, 
when we want to enhance a description of an action domain by postulating additional 
effects of actions, or by assuming new preconditions. Introducing a block structure in 
the axiom set clearly limits the degree of elaboration tolerance that can be achieved, 
and one may ask whether the proposal presented in this paper defeats the very purpose 
of the nonmonotonic enterprise. 
This is a serious criticism. We would have preferred to use traditional “one-level”, 
or “unstructured” axiom sets, if that did not prevent circumscription from becoming 
a convenient knowledge representation tool. Unfortunately, the one-level approach does 
not seem to be successful. But it appears that, even with nesting, circumscription leads to 
a useful form of elaboration tolerance if each block represents an intuitively meaningful 
structural unit, a reasonable “group of axioms”. This is the case, for instance, in our 
formulations of causal minimization and explanation closure. 
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